SUPREME COURT RULINGS ON STREET PREACHING AND
PUBLIC SPEECH IN GENERAL
U.S. Iowa, 1969: Undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance is not enough to overcome right to freedom of expression. U.S.C.A.
Const. Amend. I (Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist. 89 S.
Ct. 733, 393/ U.S. 5()3/21 L. Eid. 2d. 731).
Also, see identical ruling, Federal District Court,
Texas, 1969: (Calbillo v. San Jancinto Junior College, 305 F. Supp. 857, cause
remanded 434 F. 2d. 609, appeal after remand 446 F. 2d. 887).
Federal Court of Appeals, Florida, 1972: Hostile audience
is not basis for restraining otherwise legal first amendment activity. U.S.C.A.
Const. Amend. I (Collie v. Chicago Park Dist., 460 F. 2d. 746).
Federal Court of Appeals, Florida, 1974: Public
expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because ideas are themselves of
offensive to some of their hearers. West's F.S.A. 877.03; U.S.C.A. Const. Amend.
I (Wiegand v. Seaver, 504 F. 2d. 303).
Federal Court of Appeals, Indiana, 1974: Freedom of
expression (does not mean freedom to express only approved ideas; it means
freedom to express any idea. (Perry v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 499 F.
2d. 797).
Federal Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, 1977: The
Constitution mandates that access to the streets, sidewalks, parks, and other
similar public places for purpose of exercising first amendment rights cannot be
denied broadly and absolutely. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. I (Washington Mobilization
Committee v. Cullinane, 566 F. 2d. 107, 184 U. S. App. D. C. 215).
United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin, April 30,
1970: An ordinance that proscribes conduct that tends to "disturb or annoy
others" is both vague and overbroad. I he constitutionally protected exercise of
free expression frequently causes a disturbance, for the very purpose of the
first amendment is to stimulate the creation and communication of new, and
therefore, often controversial ideas. The prohibition against conduct that tends
to disturb another would literally make it a crime to deliver an unpopular
speech that resulted in a "disturbance." Such a restriction is a clearly invalid
restriction of constitutionally protected free expression. (Gardner v. Ceci, 312
F. Supp. 516/ see also Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 968, N.D. 111. 1968).
Federal District Court, Tennessee, 1978: The fact that
persons might express their religious views at some place other than the public
streets, sidewalks, and other areas of the city does not have any consequence in
determining the validity of permit requirements with respect to the use of such
public areas. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. I (Smith v. City of Manchester, 460 F.
Supp. 30).
Federal Court of Appeals, Virginia, 1982: Reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions on free expression and their enforcement
cannot he based on content of speech thereby restricted.
A compelling governmental interest unrelated to speech
must he served by restriction on speech.
Ordinance containing restrictions on free expression must
be drawn with narrow specificity to be no more restrictive than necessary to
secure such interest.
Adequate alternative channels of communication must be
left open by restrictions on free expression. Davenport v. City of Alexandria,
Virginia, 683 F. 2d. 853, on rehearing 710 F. 2d. 148. Also, see Salahuddin v.
Carlson, 523 F. Supp. 314.).
Federal Court of Appeals, Virginia, 1973: The first
amendment protects from state interference the expression in a public place of
the unpopular as well as the popular and the right to assemble peaceably in a
public place in the interest and furtherance of the unpopular as well as the
popular. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. I (National Socialist White People's Party v.
Ringers, 473 F. 2d. 1010).
Federal Court uf Appeals, Virginia, 1972: Government may
not favor one religion over another. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. I (U.S. v.
Crowthers, 456 F. 2d. 1074).
U.S., Arkansas, 1968: The freedom of religion provision
of the first amendment forbids alike the preference of a religious doctrine or
the prohibition of a theory which is deemed antagonistic to a particular dogma.
The state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from
views distasteful to them. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. I (Epperson v. State of
Arkansas, 89 S. Ct. 266).
Federal Court of Appeals, Texas, 1972: "Controversy" is
never sufficient in and of itself to stifle the views of any citizen. U.S.C.A.
Const. Amend. I (Shanlcy v. Northeast Independent School Dist., Bexar County,
Texas, 462 F. 2d. 960).
U.S, California, 1971: As a general matter, the
establishment clause of the first amendment prohibits government from abandoning
secular purposes in order to put an imprimatur on one religion, or on religion
as such, or to favor the adherence of any sect or religious organization.
U.S.C.A. Const. Amed. I (Negre v. Larsen, 91 S. Ct. 828).